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Abstract
This paper presents theory and evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese data that tariff
reductions induce a country’s producers to upgrade the quality of the goods that they export. The
paper first documents two stylized facts regarding the effect of trade liberalization on export prices
and its relation with product differentiation. Next, the paper extends Melitz’s (2003) model of
trade with heterogeneous firms by introducing endogenous quality choice. The model predicts that
a reduction in the import tariff induces an incumbent importer/exporter to increase the quality
of its exports and to raise its export price in industries where the scope for quality differentiation
is large while to lower its export price in industries where the scope for quality differentiation is
small. The predictions are consistent with the stylized facts based on Chinese data and robust to
various estimation specifications.
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1 Introduction
Rapid trade liberalization has transformed the economies of many developing countries. As these
countries have scaled back tariffs, their firms have gained access to cheaper and higher quality in-
termediate inputs from abroad. Greater access to foreign intermediate inputs has been associated
with higher firm-level productivity (Pavcnik, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007, among others),1 and
other firm-level adjustments in domestic product scope, export value, and export scope, for instance,
Goldberg et al. (2010).
In this paper, we present theory and evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese data that tariff
reductions also induce a country’s producers to upgrade the quality of the goods that they export.2
Such a link between trade liberalization and export quality is important because the production of
high-quality goods is often viewed as a pre-condition for export success and for economic development
(Amiti and Khandelwal, 2013). As shown by Schott (2004), international specialization is largely
across levels of quality within industry rather than across industries, which suggests that development
is in part about the upgrading of the quality of an existing set of goods. Our results demonstrate that
tariffs can hold back quality upgrading and thus development if they raise the cost of importing high
quality inputs.
We begin our analyses by documenting two stylized facts regarding the relationship between the
arguably exogenous tariff reductions imposed on China by WTO accession and export prices for
ordinary (non-processing) Chinese exporters. First, as the tariffs paid by a firm on imported inputs
fall, the firm raises its export prices at different aggregation levels. Second, this effect is limited to
only differentiated goods, and is even reversed for homogeneous goods.
We explain these facts and extend Melitz (2003) by introducing endogenous product quality. Fo-
cusing on the behavior of firms that both import and export, we analyze the impact on a firm’s export
prices and product quality of a reduction in intermediate input tariffs. In the model, a reduction in
import tariff induces firms to choose higher output quality and to increase export prices in indus-
tries where the scope for quality differentiation is large, but in industries where the scope for quality
differentiation is small, a reduction in import tariff induces firms to lower export prices.
We then test the model’s predictions using a panel data for Chinese firms over the period 2001-
2006. The unilateral trade liberalization imposed on China as a condition of accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) provides a source of exogeneous variation that allows us to quantify the
impact of tariff reduction on firm export prices.3 Another advantage of our firm-level data combined
1Another branch of literature relates imported intermediate inputs and firm TFP or aggregate productivity but does
not empirically investigate trade liberalization, such as Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Gopinath and Neiman (2011),
and Halpern et al. (2011).
2De Loecker et al. (2012) use Indian data to make related points about the effect of trade liberalization on prices and
markup.
3As is well known, China has long enjoyed MFN treatment by major trading partners prior to joining the WTO. We
acknowledge that foreign importers may have been induced to form longer term relationships with Chinese producers
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with product-level Chinese customs data is that it allows us to create very precise firm-level measures
of import tariff reductions. These firm-level tariff reduction measures allow us to capture the true
extent of within industry heterogeneity in trade liberalization. To confirm the robustness of our results,
we also employ the conventional measures of industry input/output tariffs and show that they also
substantiate the predictions of our model. We focus primarily on long differences at the firm-product-
country level to eliminate many sources of time invariant heterogeneity and to address concerns of the
endogeneity of firm-level import behavior by using instrumental variable estimation.
Our empirical estimates confirm the main predictions of our model. First, firms that face larger
reductions in the tariffs imposed on their imported inputs see their export prices rise when the exported
good is in an industry where the scope for quality differentiation is large but not when the exported
good is in an industry where the scope for quality differentiation is small. This result does not appear
in a placebo sample of export processing firms that were never subjected to tariffs. The result does
appear, largely unchanged, when looking at various time spans over which there is less exchange rate
variation. Finally, the results appear with or without the inclusion of a large battery of time varying
firm and industry controls.
The key value-added of this paper is to provide compelling analysis that trade liberalization induces
firms to upgrade their export quality. The comparison of testing both the cases associated with large
and small scope for quality differentiation provides evidence to support the mechanism of quality
adjustment. A key strength of the empirical analysis is that it demonstrates that export prices rise
where they should be rising: in goods with greater scope for quality upgrading, i.e., goods in an
industry with larger scope for quality differentiation. Essentially, homogeneous goods and goods in
an industry with small scope for quality differentiation are a placebo: tariff reductions do not lead to
higher export prices where they should not.
This paper contributes to several branches of the literature on trade liberalization. First, this paper
is related to the literature examining the effect of imported inputs on productivity and growth, such
as Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) and Halpern et al. (2011). Second, this paper joins the literature
exploring the effect of trade liberalization on productivity, for example, Trefler (2004) for Canada,
Amiti and Konings (2007) for Indonesia, Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) for India, Pavcnik (2002)
and Tybout et al. (1991) for Chile, among others. A key strength of our paper is in the level of
disaggregation afforded by the data and by the estimation strategy. Our analysis holds constant the
firm-product-country of destination, thereby eliminating many possible sources of spurious variation.
Our focus on export prices and qualities also goes far in identifying quality variation separately from
variation in production efficiency.
This paper also complements the large quality-and-trade literature in confirming the prevalence of
product quality heterogeneity at the firm level and the mechanism of quality in the presence of trade
after accession.
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liberalization. Our finding of a positive relationship between firm productivity and export prices is
consistent with the findings of the literature on product quality.4 What distinguishes our paper from
the literature, however, is that we emphasize that the impacts of trade liberalization on optimal prices
act through the optimal adjustment of product quality. Lastly, this paper complements the empirical
literature by affirming the effects of imported intermediate inputs on firms’ attributes such as domestic
product scope, export value, and export scope, for example, Goldberg et al. (2010) find that the use
of imported inputs increases product scope for Indian firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3
documents the stylized facts. To explain the stylized facts, Section 4 presents a trade model with
heterogeneous firms, featuring endogenous product quality and highlighting the difference between
goods with large and small scope for quality differentiation. Section 5 introduces the strategy of the
empirical analysis and the measurement issues. Section 6 presents the main results and Section 7
provides some robustness checks. The final section concludes.
2 Data
Our analysis of the effects of tariff reduction on export quality relies on data extracted from three
sources. First, firm-product-level export and import data is obtained from China’s General Adminis-
tration of Customs. Second, product-level tariff data is obtained from the World Trade Organization.
Finally, measures of the characteristics of Chinese firms is obtained from the National Bureau of
Statistics of China (NBSC). We briefly discuss the construction of our dataset in turn as follows but
leave the details to Appendix A.1.
China’s General Administration of Customs provides us with the universe of all Chinese trade
transactions by importing and by exporting firm at the HS 8-digit level for the years 2001-2006.
Each trade transaction includes import and export values, quantities, products, source and destina-
tion countries, custom’s regime (e.g. “Processing and Assembling”and “Processing with Imported
Materials”), type of enterprise (e.g. state owned, domestic private firms, foreign invested, and joint
ventures), and contact information for the firm (e.g., company name, telephone, zip code, contact
person). We selected a subsample of firms from this dataset that met several requirements. First,
as our interest is the effect of tariff reduction on export quality, we excluded from our main analyses
export processing firms because these firms never had to pay tariffs in the first place. As a robustness
check, however, we consider a sample of export processors for a placebo analysis. Second, we also
exclude all intermediary firms from the customs data, following the similar method as in Ahn et al.
(2011) and Tang and Zhang (2012). The trade data is then aggregated to firm-product-country-year.
We have aggregated the data to the HS 6-digit level so as to be able to concord it consistently over
4For example, Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Hallak (2010), Johnson (2012), Gervais (2013),
Manova and Zhang (2012a), among others.
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time because China changed HS 8-digit codes in 2002, and the concordance between the old and new
HS 8-digit codes (before and after 2002) is not available. To ensure the consistency of the product
categorization over time (2001-2006), we adopt HS 6-digit codes maintained by the World Customs
Organization (WCO) and use the conversion table from the UN Comtrade to convert the HS 2002
codes into the HS 1996 codes. For the export price, we compute unit values by dividing deflated
export values by physical quantities.5
The Chinese import tariff data are obtained from the WTO website, available as MFN (most-
favored nation) applied tariff at the HS 8-digit level and our sample period is 2001-2006.6 We are forced
to aggregate this data to the HS 6-digit level, however, and the average tariff is then computed at HS6
level by using each HS8 tariff line within the same HS6 code. Our empirical analysis for product/variety
therefore refers to either HS6 product category or HS6-destination country combination.
Our analysis uses additional information about the characteristics of Chinese exporters for two
reasons. First, we use a number of firm characteristics, such as TFP, employment, and capital intensity,
as controls. Second, we will want to explore how the size of the effect of import tariff reduction on
export quality varies with firm characteristics. We therefore merge the firm-product-level trade data
from Chinese Customs with firm-level production data, collected and maintained by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). This database covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and
non-state-owned enterprises with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB (Chinese currency). The
NBSC database contains detailed firm-level information of manufacturing enterprises in China, such
as employment, capital stock, gross output, value added, firm identification (e.g., company name,
telephone number, zip code, contact person, etc.), and complete information on the three major
accounting statements (i.e., balance sheets, profit & loss accounts, and cash flow statements).
We use the contact information of manufacturing firms to match the firm-product-level trade data
from the Chinese Customs Database to the NBSC Database.7 Compared with all the exporting and
importing firms under the ordinary trade regime reported by the Customs Database, the matching
rate of our sample (in terms of the number of firms) covers 45.3% of exporters and 40.2% of importers,
corresponding to 52.4% of total export value and 42% of total import value reported by the Customs
Database. Compared with the manufacturing exporting firms in the NBSC Database, the matching
rate of our sample (in terms of the number of firms) varies from 54% to 63% between 2001 and 2006,
which covers more than 60% of total value of firm exports in the manufacturing sector reported by
the NBSC Database. We cannot compare our sample with the NBSC Database regarding the number
of importers and total import value because the NBSC Database does not contain any information on
5We deflate the export value using output deflators and the import value using input deflators from Brandt et al.
(2012). The deflator is at 4-digit CIC (Chinese industrial classification) industry level. (see appendix A.1 for more
details)
6The tariff data are available at http://tariffdata.wto.org/ReportersAndProducts.aspx.
7In the NBSC Database, firms are identified by their corporate representative codes and contact information. While
in the Customs Database, firms are identified by their corporate custom codes and contact information. These two
coding systems are neither consistent, nor transferable with each other.
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firms’ imports. To explore whether the reduction in the sample due to the merging of the databases
is an issue, we compare the relationship between export prices and quality and import tariffs in the
full sample of the Customs Database to the smaller merged sample and find no significant differences.
3 Stylized Facts
This section documents two stylized facts about the relationship between trade liberalization and
export prices and how this relationship depends on product differentiation based on Chinese data.
As China joined the WTO in December of 2001, we use the data from 2001 to represent the pre-
liberalization period, and then use the data from 2006 to represent the post-liberalization period. We
define product at either HS6 level or HS6-destination country level. We adopt two aggregation levels
for product definition because in future econometrics specifications we will show that compositional
effect, that is the redirection of exports to countries where higher prices can be charged, does occur,
but that the size of compositional shifts is relatively modest.
First, we examine the changes in (log) export prices by the incumbent exporting/importing firms
that are present in both pre- and post-liberalization periods via the levels of export prices in both 2001
and 2006 (see Table 1). We divide firms into two groups, namely, high-productivity firms and low-
productivity firms, according to whether their labor productivity (value added per worker) is above
or below the median in the pooled sample in 2001.8 Within each group, we compute the median and
mean (log) export price per product per firm in 2001 and in 2006.
Table 1: Export Prices in 2001 and 2006
Productivity ≤50th (in 2001) Productivity >50th (in 2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2001 2006 2001 2006
Export Price (HS6)
Per Firm-product, median 1.28 1.46 1.52 1.63
Per Firm-product, mean 1.41 1.62 1.90 1.99
Export Price (HS6-country)
Per Firm-product-country, median 1.25 1.41 1.53 1.59
Per Firm-product-country, mean 1.36 1.55 1.90 1.98
Table 1 shows that on average, within each group of firms (i.e., either more productive or less
productive firms), the price levels in 2006 are always higher than the price levels in 2001. This suggests
that from 2001 to 2006 those incumbent firms all raise unit value export prices. Note that unit value
export prices are computed by deflated export value, and therefore, it implies that in general firms
increase export prices relative to domestic deflator after trade liberalization. Also, in the same year,
the price levels of high-productivity firms are always higher than those of low-productivity firms. To
further illustrate the shifting pattern of export prices from 2001 to 2006, we plot the distributions of
8Using estimated total factor productivity (TFP) by various methods as group criteria yields similar patterns.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Export Prices in 2001 and 2006
the export price (in natural logarithm). In the left panel of Figure 1, we include only firm-HS6 product
pairs that are present in both years for the distribution of prices. Then we compare export prices over
time by regressing them on firm-HS6 product fixed effects and plotting the residuals. Analogously,
in the right panel of Figure 1, we include only firm-product-country combinations that are present in
both years. Then we compare export prices for each combination over time by regressing them on
firm-product-country fixed effects and plotting the residuals. To ensure that our results are not driven
by outliers, we remove outliers in the bottom and top 2nd percentiles. The distributions of export
prices for both HS6 product and HS6-country move to the right in 2006. Thus, we summarize the
first stylized fact as follows:
Stylized fact 1. Firms tend to raise export prices in the post-liberalization period at both
product-destination level and product level.
Table 2: Change in Export Prices: Differentiated vs. Homogeneous Products
(1) (2) (3)
Whole sample Differentiated goods Homogeneous goods
Change in Export Prices (HS6):
Per Firm-product, median 11.82 14.21 0.44
Per Firm-product, mean 16.36 17.70 7.78
Change in Export Prices (HS6-country):
Per Firm-product-country, median 10.25 11.35 2.72
Per Firm-product-country, mean 13.47 14.59 4.88
Notes: Change in price is in percentage term.
Second, to explore whether the effect of trade liberalization on prices depends on product differ-
entiation, we divide products into two groups: products with large scope for quality differentiation
and products with small scope for quality differentiation. Adopting Rauch’s product classification
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Figure 2: Distribution of Export Prices by Product Differentiation (2001 vs. 2006)
(Rauch, 1999), we use differentiated goods and homogeneous goods as proxies for the above two
groups, and compute the change in export prices for these two groups of products. Table 2 shows
that the price changes of differentiated goods are significantly larger than those of the whole sample
and of homogeneous goods. Figure 2 also presents the differential effect of product differentiation on
price distributions: the export prices of differentiated goods significantly increase from 2001 to 2006
(see Panel (a)); while the export prices of homogeneous goods nearly remain unchanged over time,
and in part of the distribution (at HS6 level) even decrease after trade liberalization (see Panel (b)).
This suggests that the effect of tariff reduction on export prices depends on the scope for product
differentiation. The result is summarized as the following finding:
Stylized fact 2. In the post-liberalization period, export prices in industries where the
scope for quality differentiation is large tend to significantly increase while the change
in export prices in industries associated with small scope for quality differentiation is
nonsignificant or even ambiguous.
4 A Model of Export Price and Quality
In this section, we provide a simple, partial equilibrium model to organize our econometric analysis.
We consider the behavior of a firm that is sufficiently productive to incur fixed costs to both export a
final good and to import intermediate inputs. A reduction in the tariff on imported intermediate inputs
8
lowers the firm’s marginal costs on its existing set of imported intermediates (intensive margin) and
induces the firm to expand the set of varieties imported (extensive margin). The resulting reduction in
the firm’s marginal cost has effects that are similar to an increase in the firm’s underlying productivity.
We allow the firm to choose the quality of the final good that exports. Higher quality increases demand
but comes at the cost of higher marginal costs of production. When goods are sufficiently differentiated
in terms of quality, the impact of a tariff reduction on imports is an increase in quality of the export
that is sufficiently large that the price of exports increases. When goods are relatively homogeneous,
quality increases but by a small enough amount that the price charged by the exporter falls.
4.1 Assumptions
As we are interested in how firms behave both within and across industries, we consider the following
system of preferences:
U =
I∑
i
νi ln
[∫
ω∈Ωi
q(ω)
ηi
σi x(ω)
σi−1
σi dω
] σi
σi−1
,
where νi is the share of industry i in total expenditure, q(ω) is a measure of quality of variety ω, x(ω)
is the quantity of variety ω consumed, σi > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of good
i, ηi > 0 is a measure of the scope for quality differentiation, and Ωi is the set of varieties available of
good i. These preferences imply that in a market in which aggregate expenditure is E, the demand
for variety ω in industry i is
xi(ω) = νiEP
σi−1
i q(ω)
ηip(ω)−σi . (1)
where Pi is the industry-level price index that is exogenous from the point of view of individual firms.
Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity with the productivity of the firm producing
variety ω given by φ(ω). Final output of variety ω is created using bundles of primary factors, L(ω),
and a composite intermediate input M(ω) that is firm-specific. The production technology for a firm
of productivity φ(ω) in industry i producing a variety with quality q(ω) is given by
Y (ω) = χφ(ω)q(ω)−αL(ω)1−µM(ω)µ (2)
where µ ∈ (0, 1), χ = µµ(1 − µ)1−µ, and α > 0 implies that a higher quality variety (those with
a wide range of attributes) require more physical inputs to generate the same level of output as a
lower quality variety. The composite intermediate input is costless assembled from a continuum of
intermediates that are indexed by z according to the production function
Mi = Ψi exp
(∫
∞
0
bi(z) lnm(z)dz
)
(3)
where Ψi = exp
(∫
∞
0 bi(z) ln b(z)dz
)
, m(z) is the quality adjusted level of input z, and the cost shares
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bi(z) satisfy
∫
∞
0 bi(z)dz = 1.
Product design incurs fixed costs and these fixed costs depend on the number of attributes that
the firm chooses to build into the variety. We assume that these fixed costs, measured in terms of
bundles of the primary inputs is given by fqβi . The industry subscript on βi > 0 indicates that given
the nature of goods in some industries, designing products with a larger number of attributes desired
by consumers differs. The higher is βi the more difficult it is to design products that consumers value
more. Hence, a large value of βi or a low value of ηi indicate that the scope for quality differentiation
is limited.
4.2 Implications
Choosing a bundle of primary factors as the numeraire, the cost of production of a variety of final
output of a firm of productivity φ operating in industry i facing technology given by (2) and (3) is
Ci(q, P
m
i , φ) =
qα
φ
(Pmi )
µ (4)
where Pmi is the price of the composite intermediate input. For a cost minimizing firm, the price of
the composite intermediate is given by
Pmi = exp
(∫
∞
0
bi(z) ln cm(z)dz
)
,
where cm(z) is the lowest quality-adjusted cost input available to the firm. The cost to the firm of an
intermediate of type z depends on whether the intermediate was purchased from a domestic supplier
or from a foreign supplier. If the firm purchases intermediate z locally, it pays the domestic unit price
cdm(z). Alternatively, the firm may incur a fixed cost, fm, measured in terms of primary factors that
gives the firm access to the market for foreign produced inputs. If the firm imports the intermediate z,
then it must first pay the international unit price of cfm(z) and then pay tariffs of (τ − 1) c
f
m(z), where
τ > 1 is one plus the tariff rate. We assume that foreign producers have a comparative advantage in
low z goods and domestic producers have a comparative advantage in high z goods. Formally, define
A(z) = cfm(z)/cdm(z). We assume that A(0) < 1, A
′(z) > 0, and limz→∞A(z) > 0. Firm optimization
requires that cm(z) = min(τc
f
m(z), cdm(z)), and so we can define a cutoff intermediate z
∗ such that
z < z∗ are imported and z > z∗ are purchased locally, where
τA(z∗) = 1. (5)
It follows that the cost of a bundle of imported intermediates is given by
Pmi = exp
(∫ z∗
0
bi(z) ln
(
τcfm(z)
)
dz +
∫
∞
z∗
bi(z) ln c
d
m(z)dz
)
. (6)
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Conditional on its cost-minimizing choice on the source of intermediate inputs, the firm chooses
its price, p, and its quality, q, to maximize its export profits of the firm, which are given by
π(φ) = max
p,q
(
(p− Ci(q, P
m
i , φ)) xi(q, p, ω)− fq
βi
)
,
where demand xi(q, p, ω) is given by (1) and marginal cost Ci is given by (4).
9 Note that we have
neglected the domestic market as it is largely irrelevant to our econometric analysis.10 To obtain an
interior solution, we impose the parameter restrictions βi > ηi − α(σi − 1) > 0 so that the firm will
choose a quality level that is strictly positive but finite. The first-order conditions allow us to solve
for the optimal quality, q(φ, Pmi ), and the optimal price, p(φ, P
m
i ), which are respectively
q(φ, Pmi ) = (Λi)
1
βi−ηi+α(σi−1)
(
(Pmi )
µ
φ
)− σi−1
βi−ηi+α(σi−1)
, (7)
p(φ, Pmi ) =
σi
σi − 1
(Λi)
α
βi−ηi+α(σi−1)
(
(Pmi )
µ
φ
) βi−ηi
βi−ηi+α(σi−1)
, (8)
where Λi ≡ νi
(
EPσ−1i
f
)(
ηi−α(σi−1)
βiσi
)(
σi
σi−1
)1−σi
is a constant that is common to all firms in industry
i. Equations (7) and (8) combined with (4) and (6) fully determine the variables of interest.
We begin our analysis by differentiating (6) with respect to τ to obtain
τ
Pmi
dPmi
dτ
=
∫ z∗
0
bi(z)dz + bi(z
∗)
[
ln
(
τcfm(z
∗)
)
− ln cdm(z
∗)
]
τ
dz∗
dτ
> 0, (9)
where dz∗/dτ < 0 is obtained by differentiating (5). The first term on the right-hand side is the
intensive margin effect of a change in tariffs while the second term is the extensive margin effect. Note
that the extensive margin effect is second-order and vanishes for small dτ as can be seen from (5).
Now, simple differentiation of equations (7) and (8) establishes the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. A reduction in the tariff, τ , induces an incumbent importer/exporter to increase the
quality of its exports.
Proposition 2. A reduction in the tariff, τ , induces an incumbent importer/exporter to raise its
export price in industries where the scope for quality differentiation is large (βi < ηi) and to lower its
export price in industries in which the scope for quality differentiation is small (βi > ηi).
The results presented in the propositions are intuitive. Consider first proposition one. A reduction
in the tariff lowers the cost of intermediates Pmi and hence lowers marginal cost Ci for any given quality
level. Ceteris paribus, firms would sell a greater number units and so the fixed cost of designing higher
quality products is now less onerous relative to the gain in sales associated with expanding quality.
9To simplify notation, we have omitted any fixed costs associated with accessing international markets. As we focus
on firms that both export and import in our empirical analyses, all firms in the dataset would have incurred these costs.
10It is worth mentioning that in the data firms produce multiple products for multiple locations making it generally
impossible to connect input usage to outputs.
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Now consider proposition two. When the scope for quality differentiation is large, firms respond
to a reduction in the cost of obtaining intermediate inputs by drastically increasing their quality. The
increase in demand for their product due to heightened quality more than compensates for the loss
of sales due to a higher price. The opposite occurs when the scope for quality differentiation is small
where the benefit of expanding sales through selling more units is relatively more important.
4.3 Estimating Equations
Our empirical analysis will rest primarily on propositions 1 and 2, but it is worth pointing out some
additional implications of the model. Logarithmically differentiating equations (7) and (8) yields the
basis of our analysis:
∆ ln q(φ, Pmi ) = −
σi − 1
βi − ηi + α(σi − 1)
(µ∆ ln(Pmi )−∆ lnφ) , (10)
∆ ln p(φ, Pmi ) =
βi − ηi
βi − ηi + α(σi − 1)
(µ∆ ln(Pmi )−∆ lnφ) , (11)
where
∆ ln(Pmi ) =
∑
z∈Z
bi(z)∆ ln τ(z) +
∑
z∈Z′
bi(z)
(
ln
[
τ ′(z)cfm(z)
]
− ln cdm(z)
)
(12)
is the empirical analog of (9) that allows for tariff reductions ∆ ln τ(z) to vary across intermediates.
The first term is the intensive margin for the set of existing intermediates, Z, imported before the
tariff reduction. The second term is the extensive margin for the set of newly imported intermediates,
Z ′, and τ ′(z). As the theory suggests that the extensive margin is hard to evaluate, we will ignore this
second term in our baseline econometric specifications but we also control for the extensive margin
for robustness.11
Proposition 2 highlights the heterogeneity across industries in the impact of a tariff reduction
based on the scope for quality differentiation. We will allow for this slope heterogeneity by estimating
price equations for different sets of industries.
Finally, note that firm productivity ∆ log φ enters both equations (10) and (11) so that shocks
to TFP could also have an impact on qualities and prices. If these shocks to TFP were correlated
with the size of the effect of tariff reductions on imported intermediates, then we could attribute to
the lower cost of intermediates some of the impact that works through TFP. For this reason, we will
control for the change in TFP at the firm level in some of our econometric specifications below.
11We include both intensive margin and extensive margin in one of the alternative tariff measures and our results are
robust. Please see Section 5.2 for details of constructing alternative tariff measures and Section 7.1 for robustness results.
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5 Empirical Specifications and Measurement
In this section, we specify our econometric models and the data that is used to estimate them.
5.1 Baseline Specifications
Our interest is in estimating the effect of tariff reductions, which we maintain to be exogenous to
individual firms, on the price that Chinese firms charge for their exported goods and on the inferred
quality of these exports. We begin with the determinants of export prices.
5.1.1 Price Equations
As noted earlier, our theory relates export prices to import tariffs through equations (11) and (12).
We will estimate two types of econometric models motivated by these equations that differ in whether
they are estimated in levels or in long-differences. These equations are respectively given by
ln(pfh(c)t) = βτDutyft + βfχft + βiHHIit + ϕfh(c) + ϕt + ǫfh(c)t, (13)
and
∆ ln(pfh(c)) = βτ∆Dutyf + βf∆χf + βiHHIi + ǫfh(c), (14)
where pfh(c) denotes the unit value export price of HS6 product h exported by firm f (to destination
country c when product is defined as HS6-country combination), and the key explanatory variable,
Dutyf , is import tariff faced by firm f , which is computed by aggregating all import tariffs across
firm f ’s intermediates (see Section 5.2 for details). In addition to these key variables, we include a
vector of firm level controls, χf , and an industry level measure of competition, the Herfindahl index,
HHIi. When we estimate the model in levels, we include firm-product-country and time dummies.
When estimating the model in long-differences, ∆ denotes a change in any variable during a five-year
period, i.e, between 2006 and 2001.12
We will focus on the long difference specification given by (14). Adjustment to the shock of trade
liberalization may be slow and there may be issues of autocorrelation when estimating the model in
levels (see, for instance, Trefler (2004)). Results associated with shorter differences are qualitatively
similar, however, and are reported in Appendix A.3.
The vector χf consists of the observables at firm level that potentially impact export prices to
control for productivity, imported varieties, and any effect of firm scale. Specifically, these controls
include estimated TFP, capital intensity, firm size (measured by total employment), total wage bill,
and the number of imported varieties.13 We also control for the any effect of changing competition
12It means that for any variable x, ∆x ≡ ∆xt−(t−5) ≡ xt − xt−5 = x2006 − x2001.
13It is worth mentioning that, by adding the change in the number of imported varieties, we partially control for the
extensive margin effect.
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within industry i by adding Herfindahl index, HHIi, computed at the 4-digit CIC (Chinese Industrial
Classification) industry level in the initial year 2001. As the variable of interest in equation (14) is the
change in firm-level tariffs, ∆Dutyf , we also cluster error terms at firm level to address the potential
correlation of error terms within each firm across different products over time. Thus, identification
in the baseline specification is based on changes over time in the export prices within a firm for each
product due to changes in tariffs.
We estimate (13) and (14) at various levels of aggregation in order to infer how changes in the
composition of a firm’s export destinations might vary over time. Our main focus will be at the
firm-product-country level, but we will also consider weighted average of export prices across export
destinations. By contrasting the coefficient estimates in these two different samples, we can obtain a
feel for how important changes in the portfolio of export destinations were over this period of time.
In addition, we adopt an variant of equation (14), with dependent variable ∆pf representing the price
change at the firm level. ∆pf is a firm-level price change index, constructed by using a Tornqvist
index, as in Smeets and Warzynski (2013):
∆pf =
∑
h
s¯fh∆ ln(pfh) (15)
where
∆ ln(pfh) = ln(pfht)− ln(pfh(t−5))
and
s¯fh =
(
sfht + sfh(t−5)
)
/2
where t is set to be 2006, pfht is the average price of product h by firm f in year t, and sfht is the
share of exported product h in firm f ’s total export sales at year t. Therefore, ∆pf is computed as
a weighted average of the growth in prices for all the individual products within firm f . Contrasting
the results obtained using this data with data at other levels of aggregation in the firm again allows
us to assess compositional shifts within the firm across products.
5.1.2 Quality Equations
Quality can only be inferred indirectly from observed prices and demands given explicit functional
forms. Following Khandelwal et al. (forthcoming), we estimate the “effective quality” (quality as it
enters consumer’s utility) of exported product h shipped to destination country c by firm f in year t,
(qfhct)
η , via the following empirical demand equation:
xfhct = q
η
fhctp
−σ
fhctP
σ−1
ct Yct (16)
where xfhct denotes the demand for a particular firm f ’s export of product h in destination country
c in year t and Yct is total income in country c. We take logs of the above equation, and then use the
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residual from the following OLS regression to infer quality:
ln(xfhct) + σ ln(pfhct) = ϕh + ϕct + ǫfhct (17)
where the country-year fixed effect ϕct collects both the destination price index Pct and income Yct; the
product fixed effect ϕh captures the difference in prices and quantities across product categories due to
the inherent characteristics of products. Then estimated quality is η ln(qˆfhct) = ǫˆfhct. Consequently,
quality-adjusted prices are the observed log prices less estimated effective quality, i.e., ln(pfhct) −
η ln(qˆfhct), denoted by ln(p˜fhct). The intuition behind this approach is that conditional on price,
a variety with a higher quantity is assigned higher quality.14 Given the value of the elasticity of
substitution σ, we are able to estimate quality from equation (17).
The literature yields and employs various estimates of σ. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004) survey gravity-based estimates of the Armington substitution elasticity, such as Head and Ries
(2001), and conclude that a reasonable range is σ ∈ [5, 10].15 In our estimation, we use different values
at σ = 5 and σ = 10. We also allow the elasticity of substitution to vary across industries (σi) using
the estimates of Broda and Weinstein (2006).16 After obtaining estimated quality, we use the change
in estimated quality as dependent variable in equation (14) to examine the effect of tariff reductions
on quality upgrading.
5.2 The Measurement of Tariff Reductions
As the main interest of this paper is to explore the effect of trade liberalization on export prices and
product quality, it is important to measure the effective tariff reductions that are actually faced by
firms properly. There are many ways to aggregate tariffs on intermediate inputs that have various
pros and cons. On the one hand, one can construct firm-specific measures that use information on
the exact initial bundle of intermediates imported by firms employing heterogeneous technologies.
These measures provide high resolution to the firm-specific intensive margin effects of tariff reduction,
and are indeed suggested by our theory, but they may miss extensive margin effects and they raise
issues of endogeneity.17 On the other hand, one can construct industry-level measures that better
capture the potential to import more intermediates and which are arguably orthogonal to firm-specific
characteristics, but which may miss much of the action on the intensive margin. Given these concerns,
we consider a wide range of tariff measures that collectively can paint a more comprehensive picture
of the effect of trade liberalization on export upgrading. Nevertheless, given the theoretical appeal of
14See Khandelwal et al. (forthcoming) for detailed review of this approach.
15Waugh (2010) obtain similar estimates based on the sample including both rich and poor countries, though the
parameter has different structural interpretations.
16Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticity of substitution for disaggregated categories and report that the
average and median elasticity for Standard International Trade Classification 5-digit goods is 7.5 and 2.8, respectively.
We use the concordance between HS 6-digit products and SITC to merge their estimates with our sample.
17Of course, instrumental variables can be used to remedy some of these problems but require other orthogonality
assumptions.
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firm-specific measures, we focus primarily on firm-specific measures.
We begin by describing the construction of our firm-specific measures. We consider several different
formulations of these measures which have various different strengths and weaknesses beginning with
those that are most closely motivated by our model. According to our theoretical derivation (see
the first term in the right hand side of equation (12) in Section 4.3), we compute a firm-specific
measure of tariff reductions, ∆ ln τ =
∑
h∈Z wh∆ ln τh, to capture the weighted tariff reduction across
intermediates, where the weight wh is the import share of product h in the total import value by the
firm in the initial year, and the HS6 product index h is the empirical counterpart of intermediate
type z in the model.18 We define ∆ ln τ ≡ ∆Duty since τ > 1 is one plus the tariff rate. In
computing the firm-specific tariff reduction, ∆Duty, we use an approximation that at product level
∆ ln τh ≈ ∆Dutyh.
19 This firm-specific input tariff reduction measure is theoretically justified, and
can reflect the changes in effective tariffs faced by each firm due to its responses to trade liberalization
when the firm alters its input bundles over time.20
In addition to this baseline specification of ∆Duty, we adopt four alternative measures of firm-
specific tariff reductions to illustrate the robustness of our results. First, to ensure that the effective
tariff change is solely driven by the exogenous changes in tariffs, we compute unweighted firm-specific
tariff change, ∆Duty =
∑
h∈Z ∆Dutyh. Second, to take into account the potential impact of extensive
margin (see the second term in the right hand side of equation (12)), we include the extensive margin
into the total set of imported varieties. Then, the firm-specific tariff reduction ∆Duty is computed
as the arithmetic mean of product-level tariff reductions across all imported varieties in both the
intensive and the extensive margins. More formally, ∆Duty =
(∑
h∈Z∪Z′ ∆Dutyh
)
/ |Z ∪ Z ′|, where
Z is the set of varieties imported before the tariff reduction (intensive margin), Z ′ is the set of
newly imported varieties after the tariff reduction (extensive margin), and |Z ∪ Z ′| denotes the total
number of imported varieties by the firm over the whole sample period. By fixing the total number of
imported varieties over the sample period, this measure focuses on the pure changes in tariffs rather
than the changes in input bundles (Ge et al., 2011). Third, to consider only imported intermediate
inputs, we drop all imported final goods and compute the weighted firm-specific import tariff change
in intermediate goods. The final goods and intermediate goods are defined by the Broad Economic
Categories (BEC) classification. Note this measure of tariff reduction generates smaller sample size as
it loses those firms that only import final goods as inputs to produce exported products.21 Fourth, we
follow Manova and Zhang (2012b) to focus on foreign inputs in the same broad industry classification
as the output product. For example, if a firm buys brakes and safety seat belts and sells cars, both its
18We only use the import share as weight because there is lack of information on domestic intermediates in Chinese
data.
19Note that ∆ ln τh = ∆ ln(1 +Dutyh) ≈ ∆Dutyh, according to ln(1 + x) ≈ x.
20When we use the five-year difference, this main measure is not subject to the problem of the weight change as the
year 2001 is the only initial year. However, when we use other period differences, for instance, three-year difference and
four-year difference, the weight will change according to different import shares in different initial years.
21Using this measure loses approximately 10% observations in our sample.
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exports and imports would be recorded in the motor vehicles industry. The average ad valorem duty
reduction in its imported inputs such as brakes and safety seat belts would be a proxy for the import
tariff change faced by the firm that produces cars. If the company also manufactures cell phones,
tariff reduction in SIM cards would enter the measure of import tariff change of its cell phones but not
that of its cars. Therefore, for each exported product by a particular firm, we construct the weighted
average tariff change across all the inputs imported by the firm (e.g. brakes, safety seat belts) in a
given HS2 category (e.g. motor vehicle). We then assign this average tariff change to all products
exported by this firm in the same HS2 category (e.g. cars and potentially trucks). Therefore, using
this method we eventually compute firm-product specific tariff change ∆Dutyfh for each product h
exported by firm f .22 Among all the four alternative firm-specific tariff reduction measures, this one
generates the smallest sample size as it loses those exported products that have no imported inputs
in the same HS2 category.
Finally, we also compute changes in industry input and output tariffs using input-output tables as
is common in the literature. In addition to the benefits discussed earlier of using industry rather than
firm-specific measure, including specifications that use industry tariffs has the benefit of making our
results comparable to the literature.
5.3 Productivity
To control for the change in firm productivity in some of our regressions, we estimate both total factor
productivity (TFP) and labor productivity (measured by value added per worker). For TFP, our main
results are based on the augmented Olley-Pakes (hereafter OP) method (Olley and Pakes, 1996), but
using other methods to estimate productivity does not alter the main results.23
Our OP estimation approach builds upon the recent development in augmenting the original OP
method, including Amiti and Konings (2007), Feenstra et al. (forthcoming), and Yu (2011), to deal
with the simultaneity bias and selection bias. We use deflated value-added to measure production
output. To measure real terms of firm’s inputs (labor and capital) and value added, we use different
input price deflators and output price deflators from Brandt et al. (2012).24 The output deflators
are constructed using “reference price”information from China’s Statistical Yearbooks, and the input
deflators are constructed based on output deflators and China’s national input-output table (2002).
Then we construct the real investment variable by adopting the perpetual inventory method to inves-
tigate the law of motion for real capital and real investment. To capture the depreciation rate, we use
each firm’s real depreciation rate provided by the NBSC firm-production database.
22We also compute this tariff measure at HS4 level by assigning the average tariff across all the imported inputs in a
given HS4 category to all products exported by the same firm within the same HS4 category and it yields the similar
results. Those alternative results are available upon request.
23Our results are robust to different approaches in estimating TFP, including the OLS method, the Levinsohn-Petrin
method (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), and the Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer augmented O-P method (Ackerberg et al., 2006).
To save space, the results based on different TFP estimates are not reported in the main text but available upon request.
24The data can be accessed via http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
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To take into account firm’s trade status in the TFP realization, similar as in Amiti and Konings
(2007), we include two trade-status dummy variables-an export dummy (equal to one for exports and
zero otherwise) and an import dummy (equal to one for imports and zero otherwise). Furthermore,
to capture the pre- and post-period of China’s accession to WTO, we include a WTO dummy (i.e.,
one for a year since 2002 and zero for before) in the Olley-Pakes estimation as the accession to WTO
represents a positive demand shock for China’s exports.
6 Main Results
In this section, we present the results of estimating variants of equations (14) and (17) using a sample
of ordinary Chinese manufacturing exporters, i.e. those that are not part of the export processing
regime that allows firms to import intermediates tariff-free. We will show in a robustness check in
section 7, that as one would expect export processing firms are not affected by falling tariffs. We
begin by considering a pooled sample of all industries to find the average effect of falling tariffs on
firms’ export prices and on their quality choices. We then consider two subsamples defined by the
scope for quality differentiation and show that the response of export prices to falling tariffs differs
substantially across these types of industries as predicted by Proposition 2. In all specifications, we
present results at different levels of aggregation within the firm so as to shed light on compositional
effects associated with tariff reductions.
6.1 Import Tariffs and Export Prices
Table 3 reports the results of our baseline regression, equation (14). We first discuss the results
associated with long differences at the firm-product-destination level shown in columns 1-3. In column
1, we report the coefficient estimate of simple bivariate regression of log changes in export prices on log
changes in the intensive margin measure of tariff reductions. The negative, and statistically significant
coefficient, indicates that tariff reductions on imported inputs are associated with higher export prices.
This result is consistent with Proposition 2 where the average industry has a large scope for quality
differentiation: a fall in firm-specific import tariffs of 10 percentage points increases unit value export
price at firm-product-destination level by 4.8 percent.
A concern with respect to the bivariate regression is that it does not control for firm characteristics,
such as changes in firm TFP, and that the coefficient on intensive margin tariff reductions might be
picking up extensive margin effects. In columns 2 and 3 we add firm controls and the Herfindahl
index (HHI) at industry level, respectively. While the individual coefficients shown in these columns
need to be interpreted with care due to the fact that some of these controls are likely endogenous,
the most important feature of the coefficients reported in columns 2 and 3 is that the coefficient on
∆Duty is highly robust in both its magnitude and in terms of its statistical significance compared to
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the coefficient in column 1. Omitted variable bias does not appear to be a problem with respect to the
simple regression results shown in column 1. Two other observations are worthy of comment. First,
firms that displayed large increases in measured TFP (second row) were observed to increase their
export prices, which is consistent with some of that TFP increase being the result of producing higher
quality. Second, the coefficient on ∆ ln(Import Varieties) is positive but is not statistically significant.
The lack of statistical significance may be due to the high correlation between this variable and ∆Duty.
Columns 4-6 report the results with the price change at firm-product level as dependent variable,
and columns 7-9 report the results based on the firm-level price change as dependent variable. Not
surprisingly, all coefficients on tariff reductions are significantly negative, confirming that tariff reduc-
tions increase export prices at various aggregation levels. The fact that the coefficient estimates tend
to be larger in the more aggregated measures of export prices, suggests a modest compositional effect:
lower tariffs induce Chinese firms to redirect their exports to countries where higher prices can be
charged.
Table 3: Basic Results (Long-difference Estimation, 2006-2001)
Dependent Variable
∆ ln(Export Pricefhc) ∆ ln(Export Pricefh) ∆Export Price Indexf
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆Duty -0.481** -0.484** -0.517** -0.659** -0.661** -0.704** -0.642** -0.632** -0.643**
(0.222) (0.216) (0.223) (0.289) (0.277) (0.279) (0.305) (0.306) (0.307)
∆ln(TFP) 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041** 0.041** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ln(Capital/Labor) 0.023 0.023 0.036 0.036 -0.00002 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
∆ln(Labor) 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
∆ln(Wage) 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.023 0.046* 0.046*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
∆ln(Import Varieties) 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.020 0.009 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
HHI -0.442 -0.781* -0.241
(0.306) (0.406) (0.233)
Observations 14439 14439 14439 7595 7595 7595 2368 2368 2368
R-squared .001 .003 .004 .001 .004 .005 .002 .007 .007
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level
in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Herfindahl index (HHI) is computed in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC
industry in China.
We also conducted estimations on specifications with various period differences, such as four-,
three-, and two-year differences and results remain substantially similar (see Table A.1 in Appendix).25
These significantly negative coefficients on tariff reductions support the prediction of Proposition 2
that a tariff reduction induces an incumbent importer/exporter to raise its export price in industries
25When we use one-year difference, the coefficients on ∆Duty are nonsignificant, perhaps due to insufficient time for
firms to respond to trade liberalization, and therefore are not included in Table A.1.
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where the scope for quality differentiation is large. As to the opposite prediction where the scope for
quality differentiation is small, we leave to Section 6.3 for further discussion.
6.2 Import Tariffs and Export Quality
The key mechanism of our model is the choice of quality. The results in Table 3 support the prediction
from Proposition 2 that tariff reduction induces an incumbent firm to raise its export price when quality
differentiation is large. However, whether the increase in unit value export prices essentially reflects
the quality improvement remains to be answered. Therefore, we regress estimated product quality on
tariff reductions to test Proposition 1.
Table 4: Effect of Tariff Reductions on Quality Upgrading
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(qˆfhc)
η
σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Duty -3.866** -3.906** -7.057*** -7.359*** -8.370*** -8.567***
(1.577) (1.567) (2.590) (2.600) (2.760) (2.790)
∆ln(TFP) 0.377*** 0.551*** 0.440***
(0.079) (0.131) (0.130)
∆ln(Capital/Labor) 0.199* 0.256 0.136
(0.110) (0.178) (0.166)
∆ln(Labor) 0.328*** 0.233 0.156
(0.115) (0.181) (0.177)
∆ln(Wage) 0.187 0.278 0.0288
(0.138) (0.232) (0.219)
∆ln(Import Varieties) 0.147* 0.201 0.208
(0.080) (0.139) (0.136)
HHI -2.113 -4.874 -5.181
(1.876) (3.226) (3.904)
Observations 14439 14439 14439 14439 14439 14439
R-squared .001 .007 .001 .006 .002 .004
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected
for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Herfindahl index
(HHI) is computed in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China.
Table 4 reports the estimation results of equation (14) with the change in estimated effective
quality as dependent variable. Different columns correspond to using different values of elasticity of
substitution in estimating quality. Note that all coefficients on tariff reductions are significantly nega-
tive, supporting the prediction of Proposition 1 that a reduction in import tariff induces an incumbent
importer/exporter to raise the quality of its exports. Again, all coefficients on control variables are
consistent with our expectation and the signs are similar to those in the baseline regressions in Table
3. Also, the coefficients on the number of imported varieties are insignificant when we use industry-
specific elasticities of substitution, indicating that the control for changes on the extensive margin of
importing does not significantly affect export quality. Moreover, we add 2-digit CIC industry fixed
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effects into the baseline regressions on prices and quality (as in Tables 3 and 4), and report similar
results in Table A.2 in Appendix.
Then we test the prediction of Proposition 2 for the situation when quality differentiation is small.
We report the estimation results of equation (14) with the change in estimated effective quality-
adjusted price, ln(pfhct)− η ln(qˆfhct), as dependent variable, in Table A.3 in Appendix. By construc-
tion, the quality-adjusted price has sorted out the quality effect and should fall in the category where
the scope for quality differentiation is small. Therefore, according to Proposition 2 that a reduction
in import tariff induces an incumbent importer/exporter to lower its export price in industries where
the scope for quality differentiation is small, we expect positive coefficients on ∆Duty. The results in
Table A.3 confirm this prediction: the coefficients on ∆Duty in Table A.3 are all positive.26
6.3 The Role of Quality Differentiation
According to Proposition 2, the effect of tariff reduction on export price depends on the scope for
quality differentiation within an industry. Firms increase export prices with tariff reductions in indus-
tries where the scope for quality differentiation is large and decrease export prices in industries where
the scope for quality differentiation is small. From Stylized fact 2, we know that in the real data, the
price change for homogeneous goods is nonsignificant and ambiguous.
To test whether the scope for quality differentiation indeed matters, first, we create two separate
samples, one composed of differentiated goods and the other composed of homogeneous goods, based
on Rauch’s (1999) classification, to proxy for goods with large and with small scope for quality dif-
ferentiation, respectively (see Appendix for more details). It is natural to believe that differentiated
goods present greater scope for quality differentiation than do homogeneous goods. We also allow for
heterogeneity in the response of export prices to tariff decreases in two ways. First, we estimate our
econometric model on the two subsamples separately and compare the two coefficients on ∆Dutyf .
Second, we interact ∆Dutyf with a dummy variable for whether the product is in a homogeneous
goods industry. In particular, we used the pooled sample to estimate
∆ ln(pfhc) = βτ∆Dutyf + βH∆Dutyf ×HOMOGENEOUSh +βf∆χf + βiHHIi(2001) + ǫfhc, (18)
where HOMOGENEOUSh is a dummy variable which is equal to one for homogeneous goods and
zero for differentiated goods. The coefficient on the interaction term, βH , is of our interest. We expect
a positive βH and a negative βτ . We also estimate the quality equation with the change in estimated
effective quality ∆ ln(qˆfhc)
η as the dependent variable in (18).
Table 5 reports the estimation results of the above approaches. Columns 1-3 report estimation
results when we regress the change in (log) price for HS6-country product on tariff reductions; columns
26Results based on other values of elasticity of substitution remain qualitatively the same and are available upon
request.
21
Table 5: Effect of Tariff Reductions (Differentiated vs. Homogeneous Goods)
Dependent Variable
∆ ln(pfhc) ∆ ln(qˆfhc)
η ∆ ln(pfh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆Duty -0.653*** 0.527 -0.695*** -10.530*** 5.271 -10.250*** -1.021*** 0.832* -1.005***
(0.248) (0.392) (0.231) (3.135) (4.045) (2.950) (0.318) (0.475) (0.290)
∆Duty ×HOMOGENEOUS 1.466*** 13.840*** 1.841***
(0.316) (3.594) (0.379)
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12805 1634 14439 12805 1634 14439 6620 975 7595
R-squared .005 .003 .005 .005 .002 .006 .007 .005 .008
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in
parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level competition control refers to Herfindahl index (HHI), which is computed
in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level controls include the changes between 2006 and 2001 in the following
variables: TFP, the number of imported varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
4-6 report regression results with the change in (log) estimated quality for HS6-country product as
dependent variable; columns 7-9 report the results with the change in (log) price for HS6 product as
dependent variable. In each of the three columns, the first column uses the subsample of differentiated
products and therefore presents the significantly negative coefficient on tariff reductions (see columns
1, 4, and 7) according to Propositions 1 and 2; the second uses the subsample of homogeneous goods
and thus yields positive but less significant coefficients on tariff reductions (see columns 2 and 8)
according to Proposition 2;27 the third presents the estimation results of equation (18) or its variants
with different dependent variables (see columns 3, 6, and 9). All coefficients on interaction terms are
significantly positive at the (at least) 5 percent level. The results are consistent with our expectation
and further substantiate Propositions 1 and 2.
We now check the robustness of our results to alternative measures for the scope of quality differ-
entiation within an industry by adopting two alternative measures, Rauch index and Gollop-Monahan
index. The Rauch index is still based on Rauch’s (1999) classification but computed as a fractional
value at industry level, while the Gollop-Monahan index measures the dissimilarity of input mixes
across firms in an industry and is defined for the relevant intermediate-input sector. The idea is
that products become more differentiated if the underlying inputs are more different, which is con-
sistent with our mechanism that firms adjust their product quality as response to tariff reductions
through both intensive and extensive margins of their intermediates. Higher value of Rauch index
or Gollop-Monahan index indicates larger scope for product quality differentiation. These measures
have been used by some previous studies, including Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Tang and Zhang
(2012), among others. Both measures are obtained from Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and the detailed
27Proposition 1 does not directly differentiate between the two cases with scope for large and for small quality dif-
ferentiation, respectively. However, it could be derived that when the scope for quality differentiation is small, the rise
in quality would be smaller and less significant than the quality upgrading when the scope for quality differentiation
is large. Therefore, we expect a nonsignificant coefficient on ∆Duty when the regressand is the change in quality for
homogeneous goods. The result in column 5 is consistent with this expectation.
22
description is contained in Appendix A.2.
Table 6: The Role of Quality Differentiation: Rauch Index and G-M (Gollop-Monahan) Index
Dependent Variable
∆ ln(pfhc) ∆ ln(qˆfhc)
η ∆ ln(pfh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rauch G-M Rauch G-M Rauch G-M
Panel A:
∆Duty × DIFFHigh -0.765*** -0.750*** -13.390*** -11.060*** -0.985*** -1.352***
(0.263) (0.247) (3.621) (2.899) (0.297) (0.336)
∆Duty × DIFFLow -0.020 0.261 -0.007 0.345 -0.008 0.422
(0.310) (0.320) (2.818) (3.821) (0.412) (0.359)
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12963 12963 12963 12963 7595 6757
R-squared .005 .006 .007 .007 .007 .010
Panel B:
∆Duty 0.939** 1.113 8.774** 13.010 1.070** 1.835*
(0.413) (0.859) (3.782) (11.179) (0.497) (1.096)
∆Duty × DIFF Index -1.599*** -2.938* -18.930*** -38.900* -2.178*** -4.790**
(0.436) (1.540) (4.638) (20.231) (0.523) (2.022)
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12963 12963 12963 12963 6757 6757
R-squared .005 .005 .006 .005 .008 .007
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level competition control refers to
Herfindahl index (HHI), which is computed in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level
controls include the changes between 2006 and 2001 in the following variables: TFP, the number of imported varieties,
capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
Table 6 reports estimation results based on Rauch index and Gollop-Monahan index. In Panel A
and B, we estimate the following two equations, respectively:
∆ ln(pfhc) = βHigh∆Dutyf ×DIFF
High + βLow∆Dutyf ×DIFF
Low + βf∆χf + βiHHIi + ǫfhc, (19)
∆ ln(pfhc) = βτ∆Dutyf + βDiff∆Dutyf ×DIFF Index+ βf∆χf + βiHHIi + ǫfhc,(20)
where DIFFHigh is equal to 1 if the quality differentiation index value is above its median (i.e.,
representing industries with larger scope for quality differentiation) and 0 otherwise; DIFFLow is
equal to 1 if the index value is below its median (i.e., representing industries with smaller scope for
quality differentiation) and 0 otherwise; DIFF Index is the value of either Rauch index or Gollop-
Monahan index. As in Table 5, we replace the dependent variable ∆ ln(pfhc) with HS6 product-level
price ∆ ln(pfh) (columns 5 and 6) or estimated effective quality ∆ ln(qˆfhc)
η (columns 3 and 4) and
estimate the variants of equations (19) and (20).
In Panel A of Table 6, the coefficients on the two interaction terms, βHigh and βLow, are of our
interest. We expect a negative, more significant βHigh and a nonsignificant βLow. The implication is
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that tariff reductions induce firms to increase quality and export price in an industry where the scope
for quality differentiation is large. In Panel B, the variable DIFF Index is continuous, and therefore,
we expect the coefficient on ∆Dutyf ×DIFF Index, βDiff , to be significantly negative, and the sum
of βτ and βDiff to be less than zero. The results in Table 6 are fully consistent with our expectation,
validating the role of quality differentiation in the effect of tariff reductions on price and quality.
7 Robustness
We conduct six robustness checks. First, we present the results based on alternative measures of tariffs,
including industry input/output tariffs. Second, we use instrumental variable estimation to address
the potential issue of endogenous tariff reductions. Third, we provide more cross-sectional evidence
about the relationship between tariffs and export prices. Fourth, we show that our results regarding
the price increase are not sensitive to currency appreciation. Fifth, we use processing exporters as
comparison group to show that our quality upgrading mechanism is specific to ordinary exporters
because processing trade firms do not pay tariffs. Last, but not least, we confirm that our results are
not biased towards big firms using the whole customs data without matching to the manufacturing
firm survey.
7.1 Alternative Measures of Tariff
The results of alternative firm-specific tariff reduction measures are shown in Table 7 and the results
of industry-level tariff measures in Table 8.
In Table 7 different columns correspond to different measures of the tariff (see detailed description
in Section 5.2). Specifications 1 and 2 use unweighted firm-specific tariff reductions; specifications 3
and 4 adopt the tariff reduction measure as in Ge et al. (2011) by fixing the total number of imported
varieties during the whole sample period; specifications 5 and 6 employ the weighted firm-specific
import tariff reductions of only intermediate goods; specifications 7 and 8 use the tariff reduction
measure constructed by following the mapping between inputs and outputs as in Manova and Zhang
(2012b). Panel A reports the results with average prices of HS6 products across destinations and
Panel B presents the results with prices of HS6-country products.
In most specifications, the coefficients on the change in import tariff are significantly negative,
indicating that import tariff reduction leads to higher export prices. Also, the coefficients on the
interaction terms are all significantly positive, except for using measure 4, implying that the effect of
import tariff reduction on export price increase is more significant for products in industries where the
scope for quality differentiation is large. The results are far stronger for measures of tariff reduction
that allow different input tariffs to receive different weights. This indicates that allowing for crucial
inputs to receive a higher weight is important: large tariff reductions have a bigger impact the more
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Table 7: Alternative Firm-Specific Tariff Reduction Measures
Firm-specific Tariff Reduction Measures
Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: dependent variable = ∆ ln(pfh)
∆Duty -0.658* -0.778** -1.131** -1.090* -0.619** -0.884*** -0.197 -0.227
(0.350) (0.349) (0.574) (0.563) (0.276) (0.286) (0.314) (0.331)
∆Duty × HOMOGENEOUS 1.880*** 2.003*** 1.884*** 0.198
(0.494) (0.552) (0.440) (0.512)
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 7595 7595 7595 7595 6830 6830 4302 4302
R-squared .005 .006 .005 .006 .003 .005 .007 .007
Panel B: dependent variable = ∆ ln(pfhc)
∆Duty -0.213 -0.273 -0.808* -0.798* -0.581*** -0.770*** -0.103 -0.161
(0.273) (0.272) (0.452) (0.450) (0.221) (0.233) (0.271) (0.282)
∆Duty × HOMOGENEOUS 1.480*** 1.649*** 1.668*** 0.611
(0.415) (0.479) (0.366) (0.456)
Industry-level Competition Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14439 14439 14439 14439 12947 12947 8859 8859
R-squared .003 .004 .004 .005 .004 .006 .006 .006
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm
level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level Competition Control refers to Herfindahl index (HHI), which
is computed in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level controls include the changes between 2006 and
2001 in the following variables: TFP, the number of imported varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total
employment). By construction, tariff measure 3 yields fewer observations in the sample; tariff measure 4 provides fewest observations and
thus presents the smallest sample size.
that intermediate is used in production, i.e. the intensive margin is the primary channel at work.
Table 8 reports the results based on industry input and output tariffs. Columns 1-4 present the
results using the price change for HS6-country product as dependent variable, and columns 5-8 report
the results with the price change for HS6 product. When we regress the price change on the industry
output tariff change (see columns 1 and 5), the coefficients on output tariff are negative yet insignif-
icant. The negative sign of coefficients on output tariff is consistent with the literature that lower
output tariffs can increase productivity by inducing tougher competition (e.g., Amiti and Konings,
2007) and thus increase prices according to the quality-and-trade literature. When we regress the
price change on industry input tariffs (see columns 2 and 6), the coefficients on input tariff are signifi-
cantly negative, implying that lower input tariffs can raise export prices through quality effect. When
we include both input and output tariff as explanatory variables, the effect of input tariff, the key
variable of our interest, is still significantly negative (see columns 3 and 7), which further confirms
that input tariff reductions raise export prices. Lastly, we estimate equation (18) with industry in-
put tariff in columns 4 and 8. As expected, the coefficients on input tariff are significantly negative,
while the coefficients on the interaction terms are significantly positive, confirming Proposition 2 that
prices significantly increase with tariff reductions in industries with large scope for quality differenti-
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ation while in industries with small scope for quality differentiation the price increase is significantly
smaller. Thus, adopting industry-level tariffs does not alter our results.
Table 8: Industry Input and Output Tariffs
Industry Input/Output Tariff
Dependent variable: ∆ ln(pfhc) Dependent variable: ∆ ln(pfh)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Dutyoutput -0.377 0.508 -0.256 0.442
(0.343) (0.410) (0.313) (0.411)
∆Dutyinput -1.749*** -2.237*** -1.802*** -1.191*** -1.584*** -1.219***
(0.419) (0.530) (0.417) (0.450) (0.567) (0.447)
∆Dutyinput × HOMOGENEOUS 1.583*** 1.567**
(0.481) (0.797)
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14439 14439 14439 14439 7595 7595 7595 7595
R-squared .003 .005 .005 .006 .004 .005 .005 .006
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the HS6 product
level in parentheses, because we use the concordance between HS6 products and Chinese input-output sector to compute industry input/output
tariffs. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level Competition Control refers to Herfindahl index (HHI), which is computed in
the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level controls include the changes between 2006 and 2001 in the following
variables: TFP, the number of imported varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
7.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Now, we address the issue of the potential endogeneity of tariff changes. We use two methods to
conduct instrumental variable estimation and report the results in Table 9. In specifications 1 and 2,
we employ the 1997 tariff level as the fixed past level to instrument the change in tariffs between 2006
and 2001; in specifications 3 and 4, we use the initial level to instrument the change, i.e., we use the
2001 tariff level to instrument ∆Duty2006−2001. Again, we report results for both firm-product-country
prices in Panel A and firm-product prices in Panel B.
We also conduct several tests to verify the quality of the instruments. The first diagnostic statistic
for assessing the strength of identification is based on a Langrange-Multiplier (LM) test for underiden-
tification using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, because in our econometric model, the
error term is assumed to be heteroskedastic and thus the usual canonical correlation likelihood ratio
test (Anderson, 1984) is invalid. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic is to test whether an
instrument is relevant to an endogenous variable (i.e., the change in tariffs). The null hypothesis that
the model is underidentified is rejected at the 0.1 percent significance level. The second diagnostic
test we perform is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald statistic to check whether the instrument is
weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. The Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald F-statistics
provide strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the first stage is weakly identified at a highly
significant level.
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Table 9 clearly illustrates that in all specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms (∆Duty
× HOMOGENEOUS) are significantly positive, and the coefficients on tariff change are all signif-
icantly negative, at 1 percent significance level. This is consistent with the main predictions of our
model that tariff reductions lead to higher export prices while this effect increases in product differ-
entiation and thus, the goods with small scope for quality differentiation have a smaller increase, or
even a reduction, in their export prices.
Table 9: Instrumental Variable Estimation
instrumented by Duty1997 instrumented by Duty2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: dependent variable = ∆ ln(pfhc)
∆Duty -1.339*** -1.542*** -1.339*** -1.542***
(0.405) (0.402) (0.405) (0.402)
∆Duty ×HOMOGENEOUS 2.066*** 2.066***
(0.381) (0.381)
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM χ2 statistic 107.266† 111.730† 107.266† 111.730†
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 239.197† 124.807† 237.197† 124.807†
Observations 14439 14439 14439 14439
R-squared .002 .004 .002 .004
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000
Panel B: dependent variable = ∆ ln(pfh)
∆Duty -1.539*** -1.821*** -1.539*** -1.821***
(0.509) (0.498) (0.509) (0.498)
∆Duty ×HOMOGENEOUS 2.246*** 2.246***
(0.457) (0.457)
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM χ2 statistic 94.272† 99.725† 94.272† 99.725†
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 200.338† 110.314† 200.338† 110.314†
Observations 7595 7595 7595 7595
R-squared .004 .006 .004 .006
Prob > F .001 .000 .001 .000
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. † indicates significance of p-value
at the 0.1 percent level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses.
All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level Competition Control refers to Herfindahl index
(HHI), which is computed in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level
controls include the changes between 2006 and 2001 in the following variables: TFP, the number of
imported varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
The fact that coefficients in the IV regressions are considerably larger than the OLS coefficients
could have multiple explanations. On the one hand, this could simply be an issue of measurement error
as relating tariff reductions to marginal costs of individual products within the firm is by necessity
indirect. On the other hand, it could be that the firms that faced the highest average tariffs on their
imported intermediates were those with the greatest potential for increasing their product quality once
tariffs came down.
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7.3 Cross-sectional Pattern with Industry Tariffs
To provide more evidence on the relationship between tariffs and export prices, we also conduct
the baseline regression in levels (see equation (13)) with industry input/output tariffs to present the
cross-sectional patterns in Table 10.28 Columns 1-3 and 4-6 present the results with export prices
for HS6-country product and HS6 product, respectively. In separate regressions, the coefficients on
output tariffs and on input tariffs are both significantly negative (see columns 1-2 and 4-5); in combined
regressions, the effect of input tariffs are still significantly negative (see columns 3 and 6). As input
tariff is of our interest, this further provides evidence on the negative relationship between the levels
of export prices and the levels of input tariffs, i.e., cross-sectionally speaking, higher export prices are
also associated with lower input tariffs.
Table 10: Regressions in Levels with Industry Input/Output Tariffs
Industry Input/Output Tariff
Dependent variable: ln(pfhct) Dependent variable: ln(pfht)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dutyoutput -0.409*** 0.344*** -0.738*** 0.0457
(0.087) (0.115) (0.145) (0.196)
Dutyinput -1.457*** -1.814*** -1.633*** -1.678***
(0.137) (0.182) (0.209) (0.283)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country fixed effects yes yes yes
Firm-product fixed effects yes yes yes
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1161028 1161028 1161028 420034 420034 420034
R-squared .981 .981 .981 .969 .969 .969
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All regressions include a constant term.
Industry-level Competition Control refers to Herfindahl index (HHI) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level
controls include TFP, the number of imported varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by
total employment).
7.4 Sensitivity to Currency Appreciation
Our main results show that export prices increase with tariff reductions in China. Note that our export
price is denominated in US dollars. However, one may be concerned that the price increase is partially
due to the appreciation of Renminbi (Chinese currency, hereafter RMB). It is possible that a stronger
RMB reduces firms’ costs to purchase imported inputs with local currency, and thus provides firms
more incentive to switch to better inputs. To test the sensitivity of our results to RMB appreciation,
28We present the cross-sectional pattern with industry- instead of firm-specific tariffs because we do not have theoretical
justification of firm-specific tariffs in levels. Our theoretically derived firm-specific measures refer to tariff reductions at
the firm level.
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we also use the data during the period before the appreciation to test whether export prices indeed
increase without currency appreciation. As RMB appreciated in late 2005, we dropped data of 2005
and 2006, and conduct the long-difference estimation of equation (14) and its variants for only one
period, i.e., 2004-2001. Consequently, we have a smaller sample size and less significant level, and the
year fixed effect term is also omitted. Table 11 reports the results and all coefficients on ∆Duty are
negative, consistent with the prediction for goods with large scope for quality differentiation.
Table 11: Results in Pre-Appreciation Periods (2004-2001)
Dependent Variable
∆ ln(Export Pricefhc) ∆ ln(Export Pricefh) ∆Export Price Indexf
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Duty -0.110 -0.114 -0.424** -0.422** -0.289* -0.288*
(0.118) (0.118) (0.179) (0.179) (0.174) (0.170)
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes
Observations 18,809 18,809 9,253 9,253 2,855 2,855
R-squared .0001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .003
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level Competition Control refers to
Herfindahl index (HHI), which is computed in 2001 at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level controls include
the changes between 2004 and 2001 in the following variables: TFP, the number of imported varieties, capital intensity,
average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
Table 12: Comparison Group: Pure Processing Exporters
Dependent Variable
∆ ln(Export Pricefhc) ∆ ln(Export Pricefh) ∆Export Price Indexf
Regressor: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Duty 0.265 0.256 0.420 0.357 0.122 0.096
(0.261) (0.233) (0.258) (0.224) (0.185) (0.179)
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes
Observations 1771 1771 1036 1036 403 403
R-squared .002 .010 .003 .009 .001 .014
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level Competition Control refers to
Herfindahl index (HHI), which is computed in the initial year (t-3) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level
controls include the changes between year t and year (t-3) in the following variables: TFP, the number of imported
varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
7.5 Comparison Group: Processing Exporters
We use processing exporters as comparison group to show that processing firms do not significantly
increase export prices, probably because they never pay tariffs to begin with. As some firms are
“hybrid” exporters, i.e., they do both ordinary trade and processing trade transactions, we only select
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those pure processing exporters as comparison. Table 12 reports the results of equation (14) for those
pure processing firms, which can be compared with the baseline regressions for ordinary exporters in
Table 3. There is no evidence that pure processing exporters increase their export prices in response
to tariff reductions.
7.6 Large Sample Test Using Whole Customs Data
So far our empirical results are based on the merged data built upon the NBSC manufacturing survey
database and the Customs database. However, the NBSC manufacturing survey only includes above-
scale firms, which may lead to sample selection bias. Therefore, to further verify that our results are
not biased towards big firms, we replicate baseline regressions with both firm-specific tariff reductions
and industry input tariff reductions in Table 13, where Panels A and B present results of export prices
at HS6-country level and at HS6 product level, respectively. In each of the six columns, the first
five columns correspond to firm-specific measures of tariff reductions and the last one corresponds
to industry input tariff reduction measure. Among the five columns of using firm-specific measures
of tariff reductions, the first one adopts our main tariff reduction measure, and the rest four employ
the four alternative measures of tariff reductions as described in order in Section 5.2. In Table 13,
all coefficients on the interaction terms (∆Duty× HOMOGENEOUS) are significantly positive and
most coefficients on ∆Duty are significantly negative. This fully supports the main predictions of our
model that firms increase export prices with tariff reductions when the scope for quality differentiation
is large but may decrease prices when the scope for quality differentiation is small.
Table 13: Long-Difference Estimation Based on Whole Customs Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: dependent variable = ∆ ln(pfhc)
∆Duty -0.477*** -0.162 -0.693** -0.428*** -0.0690 -0.925***
(0.156) (0.191) (0.295) (0.155) (0.157) (0.338)
∆Duty × HOMOGENEOUS 1.167*** 1.574*** 1.950*** 1.081*** 1.069*** 1.728***
(0.287) (0.274) (0.297) (0.301) (0.316) (0.313)
Observations 48100 48100 48100 44237 27924 48100
R-squared .001 .001 .002 .001 .001 .002
Panel B: dependent variable = ∆ ln(pfh)
∆Duty -0.320 -0.544** -0.901** -0.406* -0.280 -0.785**
(0.211) (0.236) (0.386) (0.225) (0.179) (0.318)
∆Duty × HOMOGENEOUS 1.315*** 1.522*** 1.711*** 1.390*** 0.835*** 1.554***
(0.256) (0.286) (0.311) (0.292) (0.284) (0.302)
Observations 31250 31250 31250 29234 16316 31250
R-squared .001 .001 .001 .001 .0004 .001
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are
corrected for clustering at firm level for firm-specific tariff reductions (see columns 1-5) and at HS6
product level for industry input tariff reductions (see column 6) in parentheses.
We also plot the price distribution based on the whole customs data in Figure 3 to confirm the
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different patterns of price change by product differentiation. Similar as Figure 2 based on the merged
data in stylized facts, the price distribution apparently shifts to the right for differentiated goods in
Panel A, while this price shifting pattern is nonsignificant or even reversed for homogeneous goods in
Panel B.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Export Prices Based on Whole Customs Data (2001 vs. 2006)
Note: The graphs in the left and the right columns refer to HS6 and HS6-country product, respectively.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend Melitz’s (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms by introducing
endogenous product quality. The model predicts that when the scope for quality differentiation is
large, a reduction in import tariff induces firms to choose higher product quality and set higher export
prices, and this effect is less significant or even opposite when the scope for quality differentiation is
small. These predictions are consistent with the stylized facts based on Chinese data and also verified
by different estimation specifications. In particular, our empirical exercises confirm that even at the
finest dimension, the firm-product-country level, the quality upgrading effect is significant when firms
are facing import tariff reductions. Therefore, we conclude that quality effect is indeed an important
channel of the impact of trade liberalization on export prices.
There are undoubtedly some limitations to our present study. Like De Loecker et al. (2012), price is
multiplication of markup and marginal cost. Hence, it is noteworthy to analyze how trade liberalization
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affects markup and marginal cost when markup is endogenous. The quality effect of trade liberalization
on export price can come from two different sources when both markup and marginal cost depend on
quality. On one hand, higher-quality product may yield higher markup due to its greater market power.
On the other hand, higher-quality product also incurs higher marginal cost. Then, which one accounts
more in explaining the quality effect of trade liberalization on export price? It would be interesting to
further decompose the quality effect into the change in markup and the change in marginal cost, which
is left for future research. However, one would expect that tariff reductions imply lower prices (via
both lower marginal costs and lower markups) if quality was exogenous. Here, markups decrease due
to pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Therefore, introducing
endogenous markup would potentially amplify our mechanism of quality adjustment. The reason is
twofold: First, when the scope for quality differentiation is large a reduction in import tariffs would
increase export prices (via both higher marginal costs and higher markups). Second, when the scope
for quality differentiation is small a reduction in import tariffs would decrease export prices (via both
lower marginal costs and lower markups).
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Description
The process of our sample construction can be summarized by five steps:
1. We organize the export data from the Chinese Customs Database by the following procedure:
1.1 We delete all trade intermediaries from exporting firms. Similar to Ahn et al. (2011) and
Tang and Zhang (2012), we identify trade intermediaries by finding the presence of phrases
(such as “trading”, “exporting”, and “importing”) in their company names.29 We further drop
all exports under processing trade regime and only keep ordinary trade in our sample.30
1.2 We drop all observations with no destination information or destination country reported as
PRC China. We further drop all observations with zero or missing quantity or value.
1.3 We use the conversion table from the UN Comtrade to convert the HS 2002 codes into the
HS 1996 codes at HS 6-digit level. Then we aggregate the export value and export quantity for
each product at either HS6 or HS6-destination.
1.4 We deflate the export value using output deflators from Brandt et al. (2012).31 Note that
the deflators in Brandt et al. (2012) are by 4-digit CIC industry in China, while there is no
information about CIC industry code in the Customs Data. Therefore, we use the concordance
between the Input-Output (I-O) sectors and the HS codes and the concordance between the
I-O sectors and the CIC industries by the NBSC to merge each HS code with a CIC industry.
Eventually, we are able to compute the deflated value at HS6 level.
1.5 We estimate product quality and quality-adjusted price by following Khandelwal et al. (forthcoming).
See Section 6.2 for details.
1.6 We merge the above sample with Rauch’s product classification (Rauch, 1999) to divide
sample into differentiated goods and homogeneous goods.
2. We organize the import data from the Chinese Customs Database by the following procedure:
2.1-2.3 are similar with 1.1-1.3.
2.4 We deflate the import value using input deflators from Brandt et al. (2012). The process is
similar to Step 1.4.
2.5 We merge import data with import tariff at HS6 level and compute different measures of
the effective import tariff reduction faced by each firm. See Section 5.2 for more details of each
tariff measure.
29As company names in the Customs Database are written in Chinese, we search for “mao yi”, “wai mao”, “wai jing”,
“jin chu kou”, “jing mao”, “gong mao”, and “ke mao” in firm names.
30Move 1.1 after 1.5 does not alter our estimation results.
31The deflator data are downloaded from http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/China/.
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3. We merge the export data (based on Step 1) and the import data (based on Step 2) together to
obtain a large sample based on the Customs Database solely. This sample serves as the basis
for the robustness check when we use the whole customs data.
4. To obtain firm-level characteristics and industry-level competition control, we merge the above
sample based on customs data with the NBSC manufacturing firm survey data. Our matching
procedure is done in three steps: (1) by company name, (2) by telephone number and zip code,
and (3) by telephone number and contact person name together (see detailed description of the
matching process in Fan et al., 2012). The matching rates are reported in Section 2.
5. We further delete some unsatisfactory observations and outliers according to the following criteria
in Cai and Liu (2009) and the General Accepted Accounting Principles, due to mis-reporting by
some firms in the NBSC database: (i) the total assets must be higher than the liquid assets; (ii)
the total assets must be larger than the total fixed assets; (iii) the total assets must be larger
than the net value of the fixed assets; (iv) a firm’s identification number cannot be missing and
must be unique; and (v) the established time must be valid.
A.2 Measures of Quality Differentiation
• Rauch’s (1999) homogeneous-good dummy. Source: Rauch (1999).
At the 4-digit SITC Revision 2 level, Rauch (1999) categorizes industries into three categories:
(1) “homogeneous” goods that are mainly traded on organized exchanges; (2) “reference-priced”
goods; (3) goods that neither have reference prices nor are traded on organized exchanges. The
dummy variable HOMOGENEOUS equals one if the product falls into category (1) or (2) and
zero otherwise. We concord the data into HS 6-digit level (2002 version) from SITC Rev.2. The
concordance table is from the United Nations Statistics Division.
• Rauch index. Source: Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
SITC 4-digit sectors classified by Rauch’s classification as “homogeneous” or “reference-priced”
are assigned 0, others are assigned 1. Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) convert SITC 4-digit in-
dustries to ISIC rev. 2 4-digit industries and generate some fractional values, with higher
values indicating larger scope for quality differentiation. We then concord the Rauch index from
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) into HS 6-digit level (2002 version) using the concordance table
from United Nations Statistics Division.
• Gallop-Monahan Index (based on US firms). Source: Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
The index is defined as follows:
GMk =
∑
j,k,t
wjt
(∑
i
|sijkt − s¯ikt|
2
)1/2
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where i, j, k, and t stand for inputs, plants, industries and years; sijkt is the expenditure share
on input i of plant j in industry k in year t; s¯ikt is the average expenditure share on input i by
all plants in industry k in year t; wjt is the share of revenues of plant j in year t in total revenues
of all plants in all years in industry k. The term inside the brackets measures how dissimilar
input mix of plant j is from other plants in its industry in the corresponding year. The measure
then averages those plant-specific measures over plants and years, using revenues as weights.
We adopt this measure already constructed by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) since we do not
have complete information on input mix at the firm level in our Chinese data. Their method is
building upon Bernard and Jensen (2007). Their original data are available at the ISIC Rev.2.
4-digit level, and we concord to HS6 using the concordance from the UN Comtrade.
A.3 More Tables
Table A.1: Results with Different-period Difference
Dependent Variable
∆ ln(ExportPrice)fhct ∆ ln(ExportPrice)fht
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In 2 period difference: ∆Dutyt−(t−2) -0.180* -0.255*
(0.108) (0.137)
In 3 period difference: ∆Dutyt−(t−3) -0.196* -0.397**
(0.119) (0.173)
In 4 period difference: ∆Dutyt−(t−4) -0.271** -0.468**
(0.153) (0.200)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-level Competition Control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 158,616 79,777 37,427 69,040 37,203 18,483
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for
clustering at the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Industry-level Competition
Control refers to Herfindahl index (HHI), which is computed in the initial year of the difference period at the
4-digit CIC industry in China. Firm-level controls include the changes in the following variables: TFP, the
number of imported varieties, capital intensity, average wage, and firm size (measured by total employment).
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Table A.2: Effect of Tariff Reductions on Export Prices and Quality with Industry Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable
∆Pricefhc ∆Qualityfhc ∆Pricefh ∆Price Indexf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Duty -0.467** -0.531** -6.602** -6.997*** -0.666** -0.728*** -0.701** -0.694**
(0.223) (0.229) (2.656) (2.684) (0.275) (0.279) (0.312) (0.317)
∆ln(TFP) 0.035*** 0.320** 0.034** 0.043**
(0.012) (0.133) (0.016) (0.017)
∆ln(Capital/Labor) 0.024 0.173 0.037 0.002
(0.016) (0.166) (0.024) (0.022)
∆ln(Labor) 0.003 0.223 0.017 -0.006
(0.017) (0.175) (0.025) (0.027)
∆ln(Wage) 0.016 0.073 0.029 0.045*
(0.020) (0.215) (0.024) (0.025)
∆ln(Import Varieties) 0.005 0.151 0.013 0.004
(0.013) (0.135) (0.015) (0.018)
HHI -0.548* -5.517* -0.699* -0.159
(0.284) (3.157) (0.390) (0.274)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14439 14439 14439 14439 7595 7595 2368 2368
R-squared .013 .016 .012 .014 .015 .018 .026 .031
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at
the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Herfindahl index (HHI) is computed in the initial
year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China.
Table A.3: Effect of Tariff Reductions on the Change in Quality-Adjusted Prices
Dependent Variable: the change in effective quality-adjusted price
∆ ln(p˜fhct) ≡ ∆[ln(pfhct)− η ln(qˆfhct)]
σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = σi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Duty 3.385** 3.390** 6.575*** 6.842*** 7.889*** 8.051***
(1.399) (1.387) (2.387) (2.396) (2.589) (2.614)
∆ln(TFP) -0.335*** -0.509*** -0.398***
(0.070) (0.120) (0.120)
∆ln(Capital/Labor) -0.176* -0.233 -0.113
(0.097) (0.163) (0.152)
∆ln(Labor) -0.327*** -0.232 -0.154
(0.104) (0.166) (0.164)
∆ln(Wage) -0.168 -0.259 -0.00980
(0.121) (0.212) (0.203)
∆ln(Import Varieties) -0.135* -0.189 -0.196
(0.069) (0.126) (0.125)
HHI 1.671 4.432 4.739
(1.607) (2.930) (3.636)
Observations 14439 14439 14439 14439 14439 14439
R-squared .001 .008 .001 .006 .002 .004
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors corrected
for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. Herfindahl index
(HHI) is computed in the initial year (2001) at the 4-digit CIC industry in China.
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